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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Pl a inti ff- Respondent,
Case No.
15714

vs.
BERNARD SANDOVAL,
Defendant-Appellant.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

ARGUMENT
POINT I
RESPONDENT'S FEDERAL AUTHORITY IS FACTUALLY
DISTINGUISHABLE FROM APPELLANT'S AUTHORITY
AND THE CASE AT BAR
In its brief, respondent relies on a line of authority
distinguishing one of appellant's principal cases, De Luna v •. United
States, 308 F .2d 140 (5th Cir. 1962), rehearing denied 324 F.2d 375
(1963).

Respondent cites United States v. Hutul, 416 F.2d 607 (7th

Cir. 1969) and United States v. Alpem, 564 F.2d 755 (7th Cir. 1977).
In Hutul, supra, counsel for Hutul stated in his closing
argument to the jury that his client was the only one to take the stand and
that he had testified in good faith.

His comments were not specifically
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directed at any one of the remaining co-defendants.
The court in Hutul commented on th is distinction as
follows:

The nature of the prejudicial comments in
De Luna differ significantly from the statements
in the instant case. Hutul's attorney's comments
were part of his defense that he acted in good
faith and that there was no direct, but only
circumstantial evidence of his participation in
the fraudulent scheme. In presenting such defense
Hutul took the stand to explain his actions. Vlewe;
in the context of the argument to the jury, then,
the comments which defendants seek to isolate
I
are seen to not be directed negatively to the other
defendants' failure to testify, but rather positively
to Hutul's good faith defense, a defense not offered
by any other defendant.
416 F.2 at621.
Similarly, in Alpern, supra, the comments by counsel
for one of the co-defendants were not directed specifically at any ooe
Conversely, in the case at bar, the comments by counsel

I

for Morishita during his opening statement clearly were directed towara

I

co-defendant.

appellant Sandoval to the point of attempting to state to the jury the
content of the allegedly exculpatory testimony that Sandoval would be
liekly to relate were he to take the stand. After objection by counsel
for appellant, instructions by the court to counsel for Morishita not to
call Sandoval, and cautionary instructions to the jury, counsel for
Morishita proceeded in open court before the jury to call Sandoval as
his first witness.
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Following is a portion of the record concerning this
sequence of events:
THE COURT:
Mccaughey.

You may make your record, Mr.

MR. McCAUGHEY: Your Honor, at this time I would
like to put on the record at least what my version of
what happened on February 3rd--excuse me--January
13th at the conference that we had at the bench with
your Honor.
It is my recollection that Mr. Rich had just--was in
the process of giving his opening statement after the
State had rested, and during that opening statement
Mr. Rich made the statement to the jury that he intended to call Co-defendant Bernard Sandoval to the
stand. And Mr. Rich began telling the jury what Mr.
Sandoval would say, at which time I objected.
THE COURT:

He didn't get anything out.

MR. McCAUGHEY: He did not get anything. That's
right. He began, but he did not get anything. At that
time I objected. The Court sustained my objection and
admonished the jury to disregard what Mr. Rich said,
that he could not call the Co-defendant to the stand. At
that time, we had a conference at the side bar wherein
Mr. Rich proffered to your Honor that Mr. Sandoval
would make various statements exculpating the other
two Defendants, at which time your Honor ruled that
both Mr. Sand--excuse me, that Co-Defendant, Mr.
Sandoval, could not testify as to what Mr. Rich had
proffered at that time because of the attomey-cl ient
relationship. And the Court further ruled that he could
not call him to the stand.
THE COURT: That was based on the representations
of what the evidence would be.
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MR. McCAUGHEY: That's correct. And the Court
at that time gave Mr, Rich the opportunity, or told
him that he would have the opportunity at a later tin;,
to proffer on the record what Mr. Sandoval would
testify to, which later occurred, which Mr. Rich did
that, and the Court upheld the same ruling that it
had been issued at the side bar conference. A~er th,
conference, Mr. Rich completed his opening statem~·
and retumed to the counsel table, at which time hew::
directed to call his first witness.

I

I

At that time he called the Co-defendant--in front of
the jury called the Co-defendant, Mr. Sandoval, to~
stand, at which time I objected and made a motion,
which I asked the Court permission to argue outside
the presence of the jury. That request was granted,
and we later argued the motion either for a mistrial,
or, in the alternative, for a severance. And the cou~ 1
eventually denied that motion.
THE COURT: I think that it should also reflect that)':.
affirmatively said that he WOJ ldn't take the stand.
MR. McCAUGHEY: That's correct. The point Mr.
Rich was giving in his opening statement, I had restec
my case and indicated I would put on no evidence.
That was the posture of the action when Mr. Rich ma();
his statement. I think, to the best of my recollectioo,
that's what happened at side bar and what ocOJrred
during the trial.
THE COURT: That's the Court's recollection too.
(REC. pages 437 to 438).
It is apparent that the remarks by counsel for Morishita
were clearly and specifically directed solely at Co-defendant Sandoval
and focused the attention of the jury upon Sandoval's refusal to take the
stand.
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Further, respondent cites no case in support of its position
wherein an attorney actually, in open court, attempts to call a Co-defendant
to the stand when such Co-defendant is unwilling to testify.
POINT II
RESPONDENT'S UTAH AUTHORITY IS DISTINGUISHABLE
FROM THE CASE AT BAR
While conceding that the standard for errors affecting
fundamental constitutional rights is that such error must be harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt, respondent proceeds to cite the harmless error
rule as stated in Section 77-42-1, Utah Code Annotated (1953), which has
no applicability to the case at bar.

Further, respondent cites no Utah case

conceming an attempt to call an unwilling defendant to the stand in open
court before a jury.
In fact, State v. Lybert, 30 Utah 2d 180, 515 P.2d 441 (1973),
relied upcn by respondent, rt;Jles favorably for appellant on the issue of
an accused's right to call an unwilling Co-defendant to the stand.

In Lybert,

supra, appellant contended that the trial court committed prejudicial error
by refusing to allow him to call his Co-defendant as a witness in the presence

of the jury, The Supreme Court of Utah, recognizing the potential for
prejudicial error, stated concerning appellant's claim:
As to the defendant's second claimed error, he contends
that the Court's refusal to permit him to call the
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Co-defendant as a witness in the presence of the ju~·
deprived him of his right to compulsory attendance ~f
witnesses. The defendant further claimed ti-et even
though the co-defendant outside of the presence of the
jury had claimed his privilege to remain silent, never·
the less he was entitled to have such inferences as ma·.
arise in the minds of the j;; ry from the cal ling of the
witness and his claiming the privilege. Under the fa~:
of this case and the two defendants having each decline
to testify, we must conclude there is no merit in this
contention.
51 5 P. 2d at 442.
Respondent's brief fails to deal directly with the fact that
counsel for appellant made his motion to sever alternatively with a mt•
for mistrial.

Consequently, the trial court had before it the altematl.;

of granting a mistrial should it determine that the facts involved herer
were not sifficient to warrant a severance.

Surely, the presumption

of prejudice as to Sandoval arising from the conduct of counsel for
Morishita justified, at the least, the granting of a mistrial.
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing and appellant's original brie' I
in this case, appellant respectfully urges this Court to grant a reversa
of his conviction.
DATED this

I 'J,-Jl,day of November,

1978.

Respectfully submitted,

Attorneys for Appellant
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